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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine peer-to-peer sharing platform business models,
their sources of competitive advantage, and the roles, motivations and behaviors of key actors in
their ecosystems.
Design/methodology/approach – This paper uses a conceptual approach that is rooted in the service,
tourism and hospitality, and strategy literature.
Findings – First, this paper defines key types of platform business models in the sharing economy
anddescribes their characteristics. In particular, the authors propose the differentiation between sharing
platforms of capacity-constrained vs capacity-unconstrained assets and advance five core properties of the
former. Second, the authors contrast platform business models with their pipeline business model counterparts
to understand the fundamental differences between them. One important conclusion is that platforms cater to
vastly more heterogeneous assets and consumer needs and, therefore, require liquidity and analytics for high-
quality matching. Third, the authors examine the competitive position of platforms and conclude that their
widely taken “winner takes it all” assumption is not valid. Primary network effects are less important once a
critical level of liquidity has been reached and may even turn negative if increased listings raise friction in the
form of search costs. Once a critical level of liquidity has been reached, a platform’s competitive position
depends on stakeholder trust and service provider and user loyalty. Fourth, the authors integrate and
synthesize the literature on key platform stakeholders of platform businesses (i.e. users, service providers, and
regulators) and their roles and motivations. Finally, directions for further research are advanced.
Practical implications – This paper helps platform owners, service providers and users
understand better the implications of sharing platform business models and how to position themselves
in such ecosystems.
Originality/value – This paper integrates the extant literature on sharing platforms, takes a novel approach
in delineating their key properties and dimensions, and provides insights into the evolving and dynamic
forms of sharing platforms including converging business models.
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Introduction
The growth of platform businesses has been fueled by the internet and mobile
technologies, and rapid advances in analytics, artificial intelligence (AI) and
Big Data together with changing consumer preferences and consumption patterns.
Platform business models in general, and the sharing economy in particular, have
produced disintermediated industries. Often, sharing economy business models facilitate
people to transact directly with one another by connecting individuals in unprecedented
ways (Caldieraro et al., 2018). These developments have resulted in an explosive growth of
the peer-to-peer economy.
Platform businesses emerged as a viable alternative to fulfilling a range of customer
needs, including transportation, accommodation, meals, and even investments and personal
loans. They include Airbnb, HomeAway, XiaoZhu and onefinestay that are embraced by
travelers ranging from budget-conscious students and families to luxury consumers and
even business travelers. Uber, Lyft, Didi, BlaBlacCar, Grab and Ola are fast growing
ride-sharing platforms that have disrupted often sleepy, sloppy and expensive taxi
markets around the world. EatWith and MealSharing delight foodies with the opportunity
for experiencing delicious homemade food with local hosts. RentMyWardrobe and
DesignerShare facilitate sharing your wardrobe with fashion enthusiasts near you. These
services were previously provided primarily by established firms in traditional industries
such as hotels, taxi companies, restaurants and wardrobe rental businesses, which we refer
to as pipeline businesses. Other platform services created completely new markets, such as
BorrowMyDoggy which connects dog lovers who share the care for their canines. Evidence
is gathering that the sharing economy and platform business models are significantly
changing ecosystems, markets and consumption patterns (Caldieraro et al., 2018; Lamberton
and Rose, 2012; Zervas et al., 2017).
Sharing platform business models are celebrated not only by consumers but also by
investors who are optimistic about their profit potential, resulting in valuations that
often match or even exceed their much larger and more established incumbent
competitors. For example, by early 2019, Uber had a higher valuation (US$72bn; based on
the most recent private equity fund raising) than the market capitalization of
America’s largest car companies (e.g. US$56bn for General Motors) and Airbnb
(US$31bn; based on the most recent private equity fund raising) was valued almost as
much as the world’s largest hotel chain Marriot (US$44bn). These high valuations show
that investors believe that platform players will be able to capture large markets,
become highly profitable and remain so for a prolonged period of time. Furthermore, the
high valuations imply that financial markets assume these platform players have
significant competitive advantages that block new entrants and incumbents alike to enter
and drive price competition. If these assumptions are correct, platforms can potentially
generate astronomical returns on assets once they reach scale as they tend to be asset-
light. This paper examines what makes platform business models potentially so valuable
(i.e. what protects their competitive edge), and where perhaps financial markets may be
overly optimistic.
There are many types of platform business models, including search, communication,
social media, matching, content and review, booking aggregator, retail, payment,
crowdsourcing and crowdfunding, and development platforms in addition to those that
exist in the sharing economy (see Figure 1 for examples of these different types of
platform business models). Of course, these “pure” platform types can be combined. For
example, a social media platform can integrate communications, contents, retail and
payment functions.
In this paper, we focus on peer-to-peer sharing economy platform business models
that match capacity-constrained assets and resources with consumer demand for the
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following reasons. First, sharing platforms for capacity-constrained and unconstrained
assets (see Figure 1) have fundamentally different management challenges (e.g. the former
involve physical assets with all their related operations and supply-demand matching
issues). Second, peer-to-peer platforms differ significantly from platforms that own the
provided assets as they do not need to manage two-sided markets with issues such as
signing up, rewarding and managing service providers, or deal with their typically highly
heterogeneous assets (e.g. Airbnb postings differ widely on key attributes). Third, there is
keen interest in understanding better peer-to-peer asset-sharing platforms as they are
often portrayed as being ecological given that the same assets can be used by many
people. This can democratize services by bringing down prices, allowing lower-income
consumers to enter the market, and offering income opportunities all at the same time.
Finally, we concentrate on business models with a for-profit motive to sharpen our
focus and allow us to better contrast them with their traditional pipeline business
model counterparts.
This paper makes five important contributions: First, we define key types of platform
business models in the sharing economy and describe their characteristics and properties. In
particular, we propose the differentiation between sharing platforms of capacity-constrained
vs capacity-unconstrained assets and advance five core properties of the former. Second, we
contrast peer-to-peer sharing platform business models with their pipeline business
model counterparts to understand the fundamental differences between them. One important
conclusion is that platforms cater to vastly more heterogeneous assets and consumer needs,
and therefore require liquidity and analytics for high-quality matching and resultant
value creation. Third, we examine the competitive position of platforms and their widely
assumed “winner takes it all” characteristic and reject it. Primary network effects are less
important once a critical level of liquidity has been reached and may even turn negative if
increased listings raise friction in the form of search costs through information and
choice overload for both customers and service providers. Once a critical level of liquidity has
been reached, a platform’s competitive position depends on stakeholder trust, and service
provider and user loyalty. Fourth, we integrate and synthesize the literature on key platform
Sharing economy platforms
• Sharing of capacity-constrained assets
  and resources (e.g. cars and bicycles)
  › Peer-to-peer sharing (focus of this
    paper; e.g. Airbnb and Uber)
  › Sharing of platform owner-provided
    assets (e.g. ZipCar)
• Sharing of capacity-unconstrained
  resources (e.g. file, music and
  information sharing; mostly peer-to-peer)
Social media
platforms
(e.g. Facebook,
LinkedIn and Twitter)
Search
platforms
(e.g. Google, Bing,
Yahoo and Safari)
Communication
platforms
(e.g. WhatApp, Skype,
WeChat and LINE)
Payment platforms
(e.g. PayPal, Alipay and
Visa)
Content and
review platforms
(e.g. YouTube,
TripAdvisor and Yelp)
Development
platforms
(e.g. appstores and
gaming consoles)
Types of
platform business
models
Matching
platforms
(e.g. TaskRabbit, Tinder
and e-Harmony)
Crowdsourcing
and crowdfunding
platforms
(e.g. InnoCentive and
Kickstarter)
Retail
platforms
(e.g. Amazon, Etsy,
Ebay and Craiglist)
Booking
platforms
(e.g. Booking.com,
Expedia and Pagoda)
Figure 1.
Types of
platform-based
business models
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stakeholders of platform business models (i.e. consumers, service providers and regulators),
and their roles and motivations. Finally, directions for further research are drawn from each of
these sections.
Defining and characterizing sharing platform businesses models
The academic literature and popular press use various terms, often interchangeably, for
platform business models in the sharing economy. This paper aims to clarify the
confusion surrounding this nomenclature and characterizes platforms in the sharing
economy. Before discussing the definitions, we delineate the important dimensions of
capacity-constrained vs capacity-unconstrained assets to be shared, access provision vs
transfer of ownership, peer-to-peer vs platform-provided assets, and direct and indirect
network effects.
Capacity-constrained vs unconstrained assets
The term sharing economy implies an increased utilization of assets with spare capacity
(e.g. Benoit et al., 2017; Frenken and Schor, 2017; Hamari et al., 2016) and related reduced use
of resources and ecological impact (e.g. Guttentag et al., 2018; Tussyadiah and Pesonen,
2018). This means, the sharing economy implicitly refers to the sharing of capacity-
constrained physical assets (e.g. cars, rooms, and bicycles) and the provision of
performances and experiences that rely on shared assets and labor (e.g. a cooking or dining
experience). To a lesser extent, it can also refer to intangible assets (e.g. capital for loans).
The sharing of capacity-unconstrained resources (e.g. sharing files, music and
information) is fundamentally different from the sharing of capacity-constrained assets.
Unlike capacity-constrained assets, music files and information can be simultaneously
consumed by many people without capacity management implications. In contrast, sharing
platforms of capacity-constrained assets and resources are particularly efficient in matching
capacity and demand, asset features and user needs, and time and geography requirements,
thereby enhancing value for all actors in the ecosystem. In short, the focus of the sharing
economy literature is concerned predominantly with access-based sharing platforms that
match capacity-constrained assets and resources with consumer demand (Cusumano, 2015;
Hall and Pennington, 2016).
Access provision vs transfer of asset ownership
In our conceptualization, we consider the following two separate dimensions to be critical in
delineating what constitutes the sharing economy platforms: first, whether temporary
access or ownership transfer is at the core of the transaction, and, second, whether an asset
or resource is provided by peers or by a platform (see Figure 2). Different types of platforms
emerge based on these distinctions.
Peer-to-peer platforms that operate on transferring the ownership of products such as
eBay and Etsy (e.g. top left quadrant in Figure 2; note that peer-to-peer can also include
micro businesses) or Amazon and traditional e-retailing (e.g. bottom left quadrant in
Figure 2) are generally not considered sharing economy platforms as assets are being sold
instead of being shared. We therefore consider sharing economy platforms as only those
that provide access to assets, resources and services without the transfer of ownership,
which is consistent with much of the sharing economy literature (e.g. Benoit et al., 2017;
Hamari et al., 2016; Kumar et al., 2018; Schaefers et al., 2016; Zervas et al., 2017).
Peer-to-peer vs platform-provided assets
The literature frequently focuses on and equates the sharing economy with peer-to-peer
provided assets (e.g. Benoit et al., 2017; Cusumano, 2015; Zervas et al., 2017; again, peers can be
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self-employed or operate micro businesses). However, there are also access-based platforms
that rely predominantly on marketer-provided assets and resources such as Zipcar and
bicycle sharing platforms (i.e. not peer-to-peer; bottom right quadrant in Figure 2). Unlike
peer-to-peer sharing platforms, marketer-provided sharing platforms have their own
inventory of assets. That is, these platforms players operate similarly to their traditional
incumbents (e.g. Zipcar and Hertz both control a fleet of cars). A key difference is that
marketer-provided asset platforms have, compared to incumbents, vastly improved
technology with app interfaces that make locating assets and resources, reserving and
using them, and making payment convenient and seamless. This, combined with location-
specific analytics, allows by-the-minute access to assets and resources (e.g. cars or bicycles)
and enables customers to pick up and drop these assets where and when convenient. They
also require a higher degree of co-creation with users (e.g. filling petrol of cars and keeping
them clean), which reduces the “turn-around” time of assets for the next user. As such, these
business models allow the enhanced utilization of assets through improved sharing. For
example, Zipcar automobiles are likely to be used more than Hertz cars as the latter are mostly
rented by the day or longer and tend to have considerable idle time even when rented out.
Given the intensified and flexible form of sharing, platforms with marketer-provided assets
and resources, broadly speaking, should also be considered as part of the sharing economy.
Direct and indirect network effects
There are two types of network effects: direct network effects (also called same-side effects)
and indirect network effects (also called cross-side effects). Direct network effects mean that
the utility a user receives from a particular service increases as the number of other users
increases (Duch-Brown, 2017). These effects are particularly pronounced for social media
and communication platforms where the value to users tends to increase as family, friends
and acquaintances join a network. That is, network size and resultant direct network effects
can become an effective competitive barrier for competing smaller platforms (Duch-Brown,
2017; Johnson, 2018).
For capacity-constrained assets, however, direct network effects are less relevant and
offer benefits only up to a threshold level at which the overall network size is sufficiently
attractive for users or providers to join the platform. Beyond that, there is little benefit to a
user or provider if more same-side actors join. The reason is that service providers have
limited inventory to offer, that is, only a certain number of people can access a platform’s
available capacity at a given time (Moazed, 2017). For example, only so many people can
take a specific ride using Uber or rent out a specific Airbnb apartment at a given time.
Access-based;
no transfer of
ownership
Transfer of
ownership
Marketer-
provided resources
Peer-to-peer-
provided resources
Uber,
Airbnb,
(focus of this paper)
Zipcar,
WeWork
eBay,
Etsy
Amazon,
Traditional
e-retailing
Figure 2.
Separating the
platform dimensions
of resource provider
and asset provision vs
ownership transfer
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Once sufficient listings are available to make a platform attractive, further listings only add
competition to existing service providers. The same logic applies to users who also have to
compete for available service capacity (e.g. a particular room or ride).
In contrast, indirect network effects are critical for multi-sided platforms. Indirect
network effects mean that the value of a service increases for one user group when a new
user of a different user group joins ( Johnson, 2018). For example, a new host joining Airbnb
adds value to guests seeking accommodation since it provides them with more options to
choose from. This attracts more guests to the platform, which, in turn, attracts more hosts.
In other words, indirect rather than direct network effects serve as an effective means to
scale the business.
Types of sharing economy platforms in the extant literature
Three main terms are used in the platform literature almost interchangeably depending on
the focus of a particular study. They are access-based services, peer-to-peer sharing
economy and sharing economy. As the following discussion shows, the literature has not
converged to a common nomenclature (cf. Chen et al., 2018; Kumar et al., 2018); there are
substantial commonalities yet important differences between these three related categories
for which we propose differentiation and definitions.
The access-based services literature highlights the nature of the transaction not being
centered on ownership transfer, but on providing temporary, short-term access to an asset,
and thus includes examples of car and bicycle sharing. Specifically, access-based services
“grant customers limited access to goods without any transfer of ownership” (Hazée et al.,
2017, p. 441) and facilitate transactions in which “multiple consumers successively gain
temporary, short-term access to a good, while legal ownership remains with the service
provider” (Schaefers et al., 2016, p. 3). Access-based services are commercial sharing
systems where marketer-managed systems “provide customers with the opportunity to
enjoy product benefits without ownership” (Lamberton and Rose, 2012, p. 109). Implicit in
these definitions is that access-based services relate to physical, capacity-constrained assets.
That is, access-based services are concerned with both peer-to-peer and platform-provided
capacity-constrained assets.
In contrast, the peer-to-peer sharing economy literature, sometimes also referred to as
collaborative economy and collaborative consumption literature (e.g. Benoit et al., 2017),
focuses on the transaction entities (i.e. consumers and peer service providers) and
community-based online services. These platforms orchestrate “peer-to-peer-based activity
of obtaining, giving, or sharing the access to goods and services, coordinated through
community-based online services” (Hamari et al., 2016, p. 2047) and link a consumer who
“aims to temporarily utilize assets with a peer service provider who grants access to these
assets and with this delivers the core service” (Benoit et al., 2017, p. 220). They enable people
to “collaboratively make use of underutilized inventory through fee-based sharing” (Zervas
et al., 2017, p. 687). Integrating these definitions, we advance that peer-to-peer sharing
business models adopted in the literature are a subset of access-based platforms, and that
peer-to-peer sharing business models are exclusively peer-to-peer and exclude platforms
with marketer- or platform-provided assets (the latter are included in the wider access-based
service platforms).
Interestingly, both access-based service platforms and peer-to-peer sharing economy are
loosely referred to as the sharing economy. Current definitions of the sharing economy in the
literature mostly refer to peer-to-peer sharing as the following examples illustrate: “Consumers
granting each other temporary access to underutilized physical assets (“idle capacity”),
possibly for money” (Frenken and Schor, 2017, pp. 4-5). The sharing economy activity is
“centered around online platforms, based on sharing of underused assets or services between
peers for free or for a fee” (Hall and Pennington, 2016), and is “a socioeconomic system that
457
Peer-to-peer
sharing
economy
allows for shared creation, production, distribution, and consumption of goods and other
resources among individuals” (Tussyadiah and Pesonen, 2016, p. 1022).
However, we suggest that the term sharing economy also includes platforms that
provide access to company- and platform-owned assets, resources and services. For
example, ZipCar and bike sharing business models both allow highly effective sharing of
assets (e.g. Hazée et al., 2017) even though assets and resources are provided by platform
owners. In sum, we define sharing economy as online-enabled sharing economy platforms
offering short-term access to goods, services and other resources that are provided by peers
or platform owners.
Definition and core properties of peer-to-peer sharing economy platforms
For the reasons outlined in the introduction (including the management challenges
related to matching physical assets and managing two-sided markets), this paper
focuses on online-enabled platform business models that share capacity-constraint assets
and resources and are both access- and peer-to-peer-based (top right quadrant in Figure 2).
The platforms explored in this paper thus include examples such as Uber and
Airbnb which give peer customers access to unused or underutilized assets and resources,
but do not cover platforms with marketer- or platform-provided assets (e.g. Zipcar
and WeWork).
Synthesizing the preceding discussion, we define peer-to-peer sharing economy
platforms, which are the focus of this paper, as two- or more-sided peer-to-peer online
platforms through which people collaboratively provide and use capacity-constrained
assets and resources. This definition and the discussion in the previous section allow us
to derive the following core properties of these platforms: no transfer of ownership
(i.e. access-based consumption); peer-to-peer exchange mediated through a digital
platform; sharing relates to capacity-constrained tangible assets (e.g. cars, clothing and
accommodation) that are sometimes enhanced by other resources (e.g. labor); indirect
network effects and transaction volume (i.e. liquidity) enhance the matching quality
of heterogeneous assets and resources of peer providers with the heterogeneous needs of
users; and direct network effects are of less relevance once a threshold level has been
reached, which allows high-quality matching (Table I).
The following section builds on these properties and contrasts peer-to-peer sharing
economy platforms with pipeline businesses. As highlighted by Van Alstyne et al. (2016), “to
understand how the rise of platforms is transforming competition, we need to examine how
platforms differ from the conventional “pipeline” businesses that have dominated industry
for decades” (p. 56).
Contrasting sharing platform with pipeline business models
We reviewed the literature to identify the characteristics that make peer-to-peer sharing
platforms unique and contribute to their success vis-à-vis pipeline business models. The
interrelationships between these characteristics alluded to three themes along which
sharing platform and pipeline business models can be contrasted: market-level
characteristics, market economics and firm-level characteristics. We drew characteristics
of peer-to-peer sharing platforms and pipeline business models from the literature and
derived key differences as synthesized in Table II.
Market-level characteristics
Traditional pipeline businesses emphasize a centralized exchange of value, focus on
transactions with consumers, create value by controlling a linear series of activities from
input to output, known as the value chain, and aim to leak minimum value to other members
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in the value chain (Porter, 1985). The roles of actors in the value chain tend to be stable.
In contrast, sharing economy platforms mediate exchanges between providers and
consumers using the key assets of liquidity (i.e. transaction volume or market thickness),
data and analytics. Liquidity ensures transaction execution, and data and analytics
(including peer-review systems) create value by decreasing information asymmetries
between the peer groups and reducing search costs (cf. Chen et al., 2018).
Physical platforms have existed for centuries (e.g. the local farmer’s market);
however, recent advances in information technology have enabled dramatically improved
matching of capacity and demand and thus access to shared assets and resources that
previously had to be owned or rented. These platforms thrive on circular, iterative and
feedback-driven processes of value creation that emphasize the exchange of value
produced by a decentralized network of individuals scattered across an ecosystem.
As opposed to the one-sided revenue generation of pipeline businesses (i.e. selling to the
customer), sharing platforms typically focus on extracting a share of transaction value on
the platform through multi-sided revenue models (e.g. Airbnb charges hosts a 3 percent
service fee and guests a service fee that ranges from 0 to 20 percent for facilitating the
transaction). Moreover, in the platform ecosystem, consumers can also be providers
(e.g. an Airbnb guest who goes on to become an Airbnb host in another situation), making
them “prosumers.”
Platforms are “visualized as resource integrators, involving consumers and business
partners in a process of co-creation of value” (Muzellec et al., 2015, p. 139). Value co-creation
among the platform, providers, consumers and complementors is fundamental to the
platform’s value creation process (Andreassen et al., 2018).
Market economics
Cost structure represents an important differentiator between platform and pipeline
business models whereby a platform’s fixed and marginal costs are typically lower
compared to their pipeline business model counterparts (Zervas et al., 2017). The latter tend
to have high fixed costs as significant investments in production assets and stock are
usually required. A lack of readily available resources like land, finance (low-cost debt),
human resources and equipment, among others, can cause production bottlenecks, which, in
turn, increase variable costs of production. In contrast, platform businesses have
significantly lower fixed costs, mainly those pertaining to platform maintenance, and a
near-zero marginal cost of production with the cost of serving one additional customer
typically being close to zero. Moreover, platforms take such advantage one step further,
whereby they extend zero marginal costs to the supply side of the business whereby the cost
of adding one additional supplier is also close to zero ( Johnson, 2017).
Compared to pipeline businesses that manage supply through the modulation of
production capacity based on demand (e.g. a car rental company adjusts its fleet size
based on predicted demand), sharing platforms can use highly sophisticated and dynamic
supply- and demand-side pricing to equilibrate peer supply and demand, and thus manage
capacity constraints more effectively than pipeline businesses. For example, Uber’s surge
pricing allows it to attract a higher supply of drivers onto the platform to meet increased
demand in a particular geography at a particular time and at the same time allocate spare
capacity to users with the highest utility (Hall et al., 2015). This also means that capacity
can be scaled rapidly, especially during periods of high and less price-sensitive demand
(Zervas et al., 2017). Furthermore, capacity constraints are often also malleable, as
evidenced in Uber Pool, which allows the same vehicle to carry multiple passengers along
a particular route and thus increases vehicle capacity and supply. Platform businesses
therefore seem more flexible and can respond to changes on both the supply- and demand-
side faster than pipeline businesses.
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In comparison to pipeline businesses that offer largely standardized products and services
to homogenous groups of customer segments, platforms have both highly heterogeneous
peer-provided assets and user needs (Akbar and Tracogna, 2018; Dolnicar, 2018). For
example, Airbnb hosts offer and guests seek a variety of accommodation options ranging
from couches, rooms, and apartments to boats and treehouses. While heterogeneity can prove
to be a challenge, platforms have demonstrated the ability to develop and use highly
sophisticated algorithms and analytics that can mitigate the effects of capacity constraints
caused by heterogeneity much more effectively than pipeline businesses (Duch-Brown, 2017).
For example, Airbnb’s large investment in data systems, AI and machine learning, has
enabled genuine micro-segmentation, allowing guests to find the “perfect match”
accommodation from thousands of unique options (Dolnicar, 2018). In traditional pipeline
businesses, in contrast, guests are treated as the average member of an artificially created
market segment that typifies the brand creation and differentiation efforts (Dolnicar, 2018).
Finally, indirect network effects are critical for multi-sided platforms but have little
relevance for pipeline businesses. Platform businesses need to grow both asset supply and
user demand to offer sufficient liquidity (i.e. transaction volume). Higher liquidity allows a
platform to better match heterogeneous assets with heterogeneous user needs (i.e. improve
match quality) and thereby increase value for both providers (through a better price) and
users (through a better meeting of needs). That is, the required liquidity is higher on
platforms with more heterogeneous assets and user needs to achieve high-quality matching.
Firm-level characteristics
The role and strategic focus of leadership provide another important point of differentiation
between platform and pipeline business models. Consistent with pipeline businesses’
orientation to value creation, leadership in such models involves achieving competitive
advantage by maintaining control over scarce and inimitable resources that provide supply-
side economies of scale and cost leadership, or those that enable differentiation in the
marketplace (Porter, 1985). In contrast, platform business models typically require “curator”
leadership practices that emphasize: resource integration whereby leaders design a platform
architecture that facilitates building a strong network of service providers who bring their
capacity-constrained assets to the platform; resource orchestration, which is based on
efficient exchange mechanisms that match supply and demand, and thus improve a
network’s liquidity (Gawer and Cusumano, 2014); and platform vibrancy whereby asset
providers and users co-create value, frequently enhanced by complementors (Hagiu and
Wright, 2015). Leadership focuses on building a platform’s ecosystem that includes liquidity
and quality matching, and the integration and orchestration of service providers, users and
complementors which are all critical for value creation.
Regarding innovation orientation, pipeline businesses are inclined to adopt internalized
systems of innovation, whereby innovation is controlled by the firm and stems mainly from
within the firm. In contrast, platform businesses tend to focus on rapid innovation on their
platforms but, importantly, also have an external innovation focus. That is, in addition to the
internalized system of innovation adopted by pipeline businesses, platforms leverage external
innovation by players in a platform’s ecosystem which often include complementors. In
particular, attracting and integrating complementors to a sharing platform can increase the
stickiness for all actors, make it harder to copy and therefore build competitive advantage and
enhance value appropriation power. For example, Nielsen and Lund (2015) highlight how
platform business models can have collaboration as a central focus through leveraging the
concept of open innovation. Here, the role of the platform is to create an ecosystem that
enables it to benefit from the investments of others in the platform (Chesbrough, 2012).
Furthermore, working and innovating with complementors can help platforms to find
new markets (e.g. Airbnb’s partnership with refugee relief organizations and medical
463
Peer-to-peer
sharing
economy
non-profits to offer free temporary housing to people who lost their home due to disasters,
conflict or illness as part of its Open Homes program), enable brand extensions (e.g. Niido by
Airbnb which offers a range of services to travelers) and overcome supply constraints
(e.g. Uber’s partnerships with Hertz, GetAround and Fair).
Value appropriation power of peer-to-peer sharing platforms
Financial markets celebrate peer-to-peer sharing platform business models under the
assumption that they can capture value over a prolonged period of time. In fact, some feel
that many of these markets will be dominated by one or two platforms in a “winner takes all
or most”manner (Akbar and Tracogna, 2018; Johnson, 2017). However, recent developments
suggest that rivalry among existing competitors in sharing economy platforms can be high.
Typically, once a novel sharing platform gains traction, similar platforms tend to emerge
quickly. For example, following Uber’s initial success in New York City, numerous similar
rideshare platforms were launched (e.g. Lyft, Gett, Juno, Curb and Via), which all compete
for both drivers and riders. To better understand competition in sharing economy platform
markets we examine potential sources of competitive advantage, starting with network
effects and liquidity in the next section.
Network effects and liquidity
Peer-to-peer platforms that share capacity-constrained assets and resources face
two-sided markets. One implication of this is that service providers (e.g. Airbnb hosts)
place importance on asset and resource utilization (i.e. occupancy rates), whereas users are
concerned with capacity availability. An added challenge to balancing capacity and
demand on peer-to-peer platforms is that assets and resources tend to be heterogeneous
(e.g. almost every listing on Airbnb is unique), and user needs can also differ widely,
and are time- and location-specific. These characteristics require a minimum level of
liquidity to allow quality matching. This minimum viable platform size is determined by
the nature of the network effects linking the platform’s two or more-sided markets,
the heterogeneity of assets and “tastes” of the actors (Akbar and Tracogna, 2018;
Evans and Schmalensee, 2010), and equilibrium dynamics between service providers and
users that allow stakeholder utilities to be maximized at a given price (Evans and
Schmalensee, 2010).
These requirements make liquidity an important value-creation mechanism for
platforms. An increasing transaction volume on a platform adds value as long as it
translates into better quality matching of available assets, resources and their attributes at a
specific time and location with the heterogeneous needs of users. As such, a highly liquid
platform will deliver both higher service provider earnings and higher user utility than a
platform that operates below a level of liquidity required for optimum quality matching.
Evans and Schmalensee (2010) cite the critical mass constraint that prevents many
platform businesses from succeeding. This is also described as a chicken-and-egg problem
whereby “to attain a critical mass of buyers, you need a critical mass of suppliers – but to
attract suppliers, you need a lot of buyers” (Hagiu and Rothman, 2016, p. 66). The critical
mass constraint combined with value addition by complementors (who are also attracted to
liquid platforms) means that liquidity, once achieved, can offer a platform some protection
from smaller competitors and can be a source of competitive advantage as liquidity is hard
to copy (cf. Wirtz and Ehret, 2019).
However, unlike for social media and communications platforms that thrive on direct
network effects, there is a declining rate of incremental value of adding liquidity to
capacity-constrained sharing platforms once a certain level offers sufficient matching
quality. After all, the service provider and customer just need a single match for a
particular transaction. This also means that with sufficient initial promotional investment
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(e.g. incentives for providers to join and for users to try and make bookings), liquidity can
be built if the challenger has access to sufficient funding. As such, the power of network
effects is less for sharing platforms than for those that thrive on direct network effects,
rendering the competitive advantage of sharing economy platforms less powerful than
generally assumed.
Furthermore, the threat of new entrants and other alternative players seems high. The
typically low fixed and marginal costs mean that sharing platforms have relatively low
barriers to entry within an industry, and access to service providers tends to be easy
(Van Alstyne et al., 2016). While new platform concepts then to be differentiated initially
(e.g. Onefinestay focused on luxury homes and was at first not in direct competition with
Airbnb), over time, concept-copying commoditizes offerings. Furthermore, cross-listing of
assets increases similarity across platforms and create direct competition (e.g. the same
accommodation can be booked on two or more platforms). New entrants also frequently
create price competition within the industry (e.g. Lyft launched with attractive promotions
and generally lower prices than Uber). Thus, low barriers to entry can result in intense
competition between sharing platforms.
Competitive responses of pipeline players
Traditional pipeline business models were disrupted by sharing platforms offering
customers attractive and low-cost alternatives (Parker et al., 2016; Evans and
Schmalensee, 2016; Piscicelli et al., 2018; Van Alstyne et al., 2016). Incumbent players
have responded in various ways to these challenges. Responses range from modifying
their business models to focus on segments platforms cannot serve well (e.g. business
travelers who need a range of value-add services) and adopting features of platforms
(e.g. launching a booking app), to launching competing platforms (often one-sided
platforms), and acquiring and integrating peer-to-peer platforms (e.g. Accor Hotel’s
acquisition of onefinestay).
Examples of competitive responses include MetroCab Boston’s mobile app launch. Its
app is, from the user perspectives, not significantly different from Uber’s and Lyft’s (An,
2018). The rider experience in Singapore is largely identical between sharing platforms and
the incumbent taxi company’s app-based service, except that the taxi company offers a
more reliable service with virtually no cancellations, more predictable arrival times and
trained drivers at marginally higher prices. Given the pipeline businesses’ superior
reliability and consistent qualities, it can be challenging for sharing platforms to convince
consumers that the economic benefits outweigh the risks they are taking, while still making
a profit (Wallenstein and Shelat, 2017).
Furthermore, some pipeline business models have also started listing peer providers on
their own platforms. For example, BMW is taking on Uber and Lyft directly by launching a
ride-sharing service named ReachNow. In the hotel industry, following the purchase and
development of onefinestay, Accor added peer-provided rooms to their traditional
distribution channels. While initially taken by surprise, traditional pipeline players have
started responding by embracing platform technologies and innovation that leverage and
strengthen their existing competencies and assets, which increasingly will intensify
competition with peer-to-peer platforms.
In conclusion, the analysis of competitive intensity of peer-to-peer sharing platform
markets shows that beyond an initial potential liquidity advantage, peer-to-peer sharing
platforms can face intense competition from direct competitors, new entrants and even
traditional pipeline players who are becoming more effective in their competitive responses.
The question arises as to what else platform players can do to reduce competitive intensity.
In this context, we discuss next platform governance and trust, and building service
provider and customer loyalty.
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Platform governance and trust
The platform specifies the “rules of engagement,” including the information to be provided
on listings, pricing schedules, search criteria and ratings for uses to search, interact and
transact (Chen et al., 2018), and stakeholder privacy protection and data security (cf. Lwin
et al., 2016; Wirtz and Lwin, 2009). Effective platform governance that cultivates stakeholder
trust which, in turn, is important for reducing transaction costs (Ndubisi et al., 2016; Wirtz
and Ehret, 2019) and enables safe exchanges between strangers is seen as critical to a
platform’s success (Hagiu and Rothman, 2016). Furthermore, unethical behavior in
peer-to-peer transactions is a risk in particular in one-off encounters between strangers
(Hassan and Tovey, 2012). Here, risk and uncertainty are mitigated through instilling and
managing trust via institutional and legal governance mechanisms (Akbar and Tracogna,
2018; Perren and Kozinets, 2018).
Effective platform governance fosters trust through “sociality management,” and
institutional and legal arrangements that enable exchange mediation (Perren and Kozinets,
2018). Governance mechanisms on sharing platforms include (Akbar and Tracogna, 2018):
pre-selection of assets, other resources and complementors that can be accessed through the
platform: the owner of the platform may decide to limit access to only specific assets and
resources that meet predefined quality standards (e.g. accommodations offered on
onefinestay); rating systems that enable feedback and build trust (e.g. Airbnb’s guest and
host ratings; Etzioni, 2017); establishment and administration of platform contracts among
peers, including the management of payments (e.g. Airbnb’s secure payment platform that
protects hosts and guests); the formulation of rules and standards regarding service levels
(e.g. Airbnb’s “hosting standards” and “Airbnb Plus”); and legally-mandated or voluntary
provision of insurance and guarantees to protect assets, resources and actors (e.g. Uber’s
$1m in third-party liability coverage for rideshare driver-partners).
Hartl et al. (2016) found that the majority of participants in sharing networks support a
governance system and that good governance increases cooperation among members by
reducing distrust. In a study of consumers on Chinese platforms, Chen et al. (2009) found
that two types of trust are essential for building platform loyalty: mutual trust among
members and members’ trust in the platform itself (a number of further studies validated
these findings; Abrate and Viglia, 2019; Ert et al., 2016). Embedding trust in a platform and
its brand takes time, which makes it harder for competitors to copy and reduces competitive
intensity. For example, Teubner et al. (2017) demonstrated that trust-building mechanisms
on Airbnb translated into tangible economic value by attracting more demand and enabling
higher prices. Thus, we suggest that stakeholders’ perceptions of effective governance and
resulting trust in a platform can, in addition to liquidity, be an important source of
competitive advantage.
Having examined the literature on platform governance and trust, the next three sections
focus on key actors who orchestrate and co-create value in a platform ecosystem (Figure 3).
Specifically, we explore the perceptions, motivations and behaviors of three key actors:
users, service providers and policy makers, and, where appropriate, link this section back to
the discussion on building a competitive edge for platform providers.
Customer behavior in the context of sharing platforms
A significant body of literature has examined various aspects of sharing platform-related
consumer behaviors. We synthesize, integrate and structure this literature using the three-
stage model of service consumption as organizing framework whereby we deconstruct the
customer journey into the pre-purchase, service encounter (i.e. consumption) and post-
encounter stages (Wirtz and Lovelock, 2016, p. 53; Tsiotsou andWirtz, 2015). See also Benoit
et al. (2017) for an excellent review for consumer motives and behaviors related to
collaborative consumption, which includes peer-to-peer sharing.
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Pre-purchase stage
Need awareness. While conventional wisdom in consumer behavior suggests that consumer
journeys start with need arousal, for customers on sharing platforms such needs are often
driven by unfulfilled needs for traditional offerings (e.g. a hotel room or taxi ride). Especially
when the supply of traditional providers seems limited, unavailable, expensive and/or of
poor quality, consumers extend their consideration set to include sharing platforms.
Furthermore, instead of buying and owning things, consumers also increasingly prefer
access and temporary use (i.e. experiences over possessions; Bardhi and Eckhardt, 2012).
Need arousal can also be triggered by social influence, wanting to be part of the peer-to-peer
sharing economy and trend affinity (Tussyadiah and Pesonen, 2016), and an experience
“worth trying” (Yang and Ahn, 2016). For repeat customers, such need arousal is likely to be
a habitual process.
Information search. Consumers tend to rely heavily on information provided by peers
(e.g. online reviews and peer ratings) as it is viewed as credible and independent. Sharing
platforms are relatively new and consumers who are not familiar with a particular platform
may perceive increased levels of risk and incur added search costs (Mao and Lyu, 2017;
Tussyadiah and Pesonen, 2016) as they need to deal with independent providers who are
essentially “strangers” (Frenken and Schor, 2017). In addition, information search tends to
be more elaborate compared to buying from traditional pipeline providers as offerings in the
sharing economy can be highly heterogeneous and are provided by independent and equally
heterogeneous service providers (i.e. peers). Furthermore, as services are provided by many
independent providers, information search and need clarification involves more direct
communication with peers rather than the platform.
Relatedly, as network liquidity increases beyond what is required for high-quality
matching, provider and user search costs increase which can reduce the quality and number
of transactions per provider. For example, Li and Netessine (2018) empirically demonstrated
that as a platform’s number of hosts and travelers doubled, search costs (i.e. search friction)
increased through an increase of 18.3 percent of inquiries sent to hosts and 19.6 percent to
travelers. As a result, traveler confirmation rates dropped by 15.4 percent and host
Service providers
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Platform provider
• Orchestrates value co-creation
• Manages platform governance
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policy maker
Platform ecosystem
Service delivery
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occupancy by 15.9 percent, and the platform lost 5.6 percent of potential transactions due to
the increased search friction. Because of the larger number of hosts and users, both hosts
and users need to spend time and effort to evaluate more options and both parties could
communicate simultaneously with multiple potential matches and make comparisons. Being
faced with too many options reduces decision making, and even when they are ready to
make a reservation, their favorite option may no longer be available (Li and Netessine, 2018).
To assist in the search process, platforms should therefore alleviate the uncertainty and
higher search costs that result from heterogeneity and invest in systems that reduce search
friction and enable high-quality matching. These can include decision aids based on
analytics and AI that filter, sort, compare and rank options, and to create customizable
search tools and recommendation systems that cater better to individuals’ preferences
(Li and Netessine, 2018), and also to design better feedback and rating systems to reduce
friction caused by information asymmetry (Tadelis, 2016). Additional approaches include
making the matching process more instantaneous (e.g. Airbnb’s instant booking function),
limiting the number of options presented to travelers through a more refined search (Li and
Netessine, 2018), and reducing risk perceptions by allowing users to challenge payment due
to unsatisfactory service (Chen et al., 2018).
Evaluation of alternatives. Platforms businesses often offer a lower price than pipeline
businesses which constitutes a powerful decision factor for many consumers (Poon and
Huang, 2017; So et al., 2018; Tussyadiah and Pesonen, 2018; Yang and Ahn, 2016).
Furthermore, platform businesses tend to be more innovative and have offerings that are
perceived as new, interesting, attractive and novel (Guttentag et al., 2018; Johnson and
Neuhofer, 2017; Mao and Lyu, 2017; So et al., 2018), and thereby create unique experience
expectations (Mao and Lyu, 2017).
Some consumers are attracted to collaborative consumption due to sharing economy
ethos which include consumers’ belief that platforms provide income for locals and
support a community’s well-being, and that the offerings are more authentic (e.g. the
benefits of a local home for Airbnb; Guttentag et al., 2018; Johnson and Neuhofer, 2017;
So et al., 2018). Furthermore, many consumers believe that sharing assets and resources is
environmentally friendly (Guttentag et al., 2018) and supports sustainability (Hamari et al.,
2016; Yang and Ahn, 2016). However, these assumptions have been challenged as the
sharing economy can increase overall load on the environment through higher
consumption, such as added flights due to lower cost accommodation and more traffic due
to convenient and lower cost ride sharing (e.g. Font Vivanco et al., 2015; Frenken and
Schor, 2017).
On the negative side, perceived risk can be increased due to the “new to the market”
nature of many platforms (Mao and Lyu, 2017; Tussyadiah and Pesonen, 2016), using assets
and resources of others in an unsupervised manner (Poon and Huang, 2017), and privacy
concerns and insecurity caused by interacting with peers who are effectively strangers (So
et al., 2018; Yang and Ahn, 2016). These risks lead to a lower level of trust in platforms
compared to pipeline providers (So et al., 2018).
Making a booking decision. When making their first booking, consumers may encounter
barriers, including learning and set-up costs, and have self-efficacy concerns as they need to
learn how to navigate the platform regarding what is occurring, why, how, who and when
(Zhu et al., 2017). In contrast, repeat bookings are often seamless as the account, once set up,
results in reduced transaction costs, increased convenience, and reduced risk. As such, the
first transaction plays an important role as risk perceptions and nonmonetary costs are
expected to diminish after the first trial. However, repeat users still may have difficulty
making a booking decision if presented with too many options due to information overload
and choice fatigue (Li and Netessine, 2018; cf. Kuksow and Villas-Boas, 2010).
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Consumption stage
Core benefits consumers may derive from participating in peer-to-peer sharing platforms
include functional, experiential and hedonic, and social value.
Functional value. One of the benefits users gain from participating in sharing platforms is
perceived functional (and economic) value (Razli et al., 2017; Zhu et al., 2017; Eckhardt and
Bardhi, 2015). The availability of a wide range of options combined with effective matching
mechanisms frequently result in high matching quality with the heterogeneous needs of
customers (Lalicic and Weismayer, 2017; Priporas et al., 2017), which, in turn, leads to
superior functional value (Razli et al., 2017; Zhu et al., 2017) at an attractive price.
Experiential and hedonic value. Novelty and experience heterogeneity can produce high
levels of enjoyment (So et al., 2018; Tussyadiah and Pesonen, 2018; Yang and Ahn, 2016).
Platform businesses can also create experiencescapes that offer added dimensions
such as entertainment, education, escapism, aesthetics, serendipity and personalization
(Mody et al., 2017).
Social value. Social interactions between actors can form an important part of the
consumption experience and offer value (Mody et al., 2017; So et al., 2018; Zhu et al., 2017),
including authenticity (Guttentag et al., 2018; Poon and Huang, 2017) and local cultural
aspects (Poon and Huang, 2017). Here, Airbnb’s idiosyncratic offerings that reflect each
host’s lifestyle, personality and culture provide a wider range of options to match user tastes
and differentiate their travel experience (Liu and Mattila, 2017).
Increasingly, however, the consumer and the service provider may not need to meet in
person. For example, a consumer can be given a code to enter an Airbnb apartment or to open
a keylock box, rendering in-person service interactions unnecessary. This tends to be
particularly the case for professional Airbnb hosts who have multiple listings as opposed to
the more casual Airbnb hosts who deliver authentic experiences. While in the latter case social
and authentic experiences may be diminished, accessibility and convenience are increased.
Post-consumption stage
Satisfaction. Customer satisfaction tends to be higher when a platform offers attractive
pricing, and perceived ease of use and usefulness of the platform are high (Min et al., 2018).
The evaluation of the consumption experience also depends heavily on the quality of service
provided by the service provider and perceived platform governance, based on which
consumers ascribe attribution of responsibility for the outcome of service experiences.
Furthermore (dis)satisfaction with the service provider performance may also carry over
to customer (dis)satisfaction with the platform itself (Lalicic and Weismayer, 2017). Finally,
customer experiential outcomes can include memorability and extraordinary experiential
outcomes and well-being (Mody et al., 2017).
Ratings and word-of-mouth (WOM). At the post-consumption stage, users are frequently
prompted to provide ratings of the peer provider and post online reviews which exert an
important influence on other users’ booking behaviors. Furthermore, users generate online
and offline WOM that has a powerful influence on the adoption behaviors of others (Liang,
Schuckert and Law, 2017; Mao and Lyu, 2017).
Repurchase intentions and loyalty. After the initial use and set up, repurchase tends to be
easy because it is a simple click repurchase with low learning and search costs. Repurchase
intentions are formed in the initial transactions ( Johnson and Neuhofer, 2017; Mao and Lyu,
2017; So et al., 2018).
Consumers’ post-consumption attitudes toward the platform depend on their personal
consumption experiences, peer behaviors and platform governance (Mao and Lyu, 2017; So
et al., 2018). Furthermore, customers tend to develop commitment to a platform (e.g. Airbnb)
rather than service providers (e.g. a host; Lalicic and Weismayer, 2017; Mody and Hanks,
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2019; Yang et al., 2017). That is, customers form post-consumption attitudes toward the
platform (Mao and Lyu, 2017; So et al., 2018), including platform brand perceptions and
brand personality (Lee and Kim, 2018), brand loyalty (Lalicic and Weismayer, 2017; Mody
and Hanks, 2019; Yang et al., 2017) and willingness to pay a price premium (Zhang et al.,
2019). Moreover, rich and authentic experiences associated with a platform were found to
contribute to creating brand love and loyalty (e.g. for Airbnb; Mody and Hanks, 2019).
If a platform can cover most customer needs at a competitive price, enabled by a large
network and variety in offerings, switching becomes less likely. However, if price
performance (e.g. surge pricing and temporary promotions) and matching quality (e.g.
availability of a suitable family home) are perceived to vary, providers and users may sign
up on several platforms (called multi-homing) and switch on a transaction-by-transaction
basis. Once multi-homing is set up, the close to zero switching costs can make competition
between platforms direct and intense. For example, both drivers and users can sign up with
several platforms and switch on a case-by-case basis, depending on a platform’s surge
pricing strategies, the availability of temporary promotions, and quality matches (Chen
et al., 2018). As such, it can be difficult for platforms to lock in customers, which makes
competition intense if two or more providers have sufficient liquidity to serve the product
feature-, location- and time-specific user needs.
In addition, when peers repeatedly make transactions with one another (e.g. a traveler
needs a daily ride to the office), they may choose to substitute the platform through user
disintermediation (e.g. Hagiu and Rothman, 2016). After an initial successful transaction
facilitated by the platform, the buyer and seller may agree to conduct subsequent
transactions outside the platform to save fees. Platforms try to police such behaviors, for
example, through temporarily suspending accounts if algorithms detect attempts to take
transactions off a platform and prevent offline transactions such as Airbnb blocking the
exchange of phone numbers or emails until a booking is confirmed. However, if incentives
are sufficiently high, actors will find ways to circumvent a platform which reduces a
platform’s pricing power (Upbin, 2010).
As such, low switching costs, multi-homing and disintermediation can pose challenges
to platforms. Potential responses are tools to build loyalty include evangelizing,
milestoning, badging and documenting (Perren and Kozinets, 2018), and incentive systems
for service providers to increase their activity on the platform (Chen et al., 2018). For
example, Airbnb’s Superhost program rewards hosts for providing outstanding
hospitality, as measured by guest reviews, for at least ten trips over a year; the badge
enables hosts to charge higher prices for their listing (Liang, Schuckert, Law and Chen,
2017). Incentive systems can be developed to encourage increased transactions on a
platform; both Uber and Lyft offer bonuses if drivers exceed a certain number of rides in a
specified period of time, and Uber launched a rider loyalty program. Such strategies
increase switching costs and provide incentives for providers and users to become more
loyal to a platform (Chen et al., 2018).
In sum, sharing platforms present their own unique characteristics, challenges and
opportunities at each stage of the consumer journey in impacting consumers’ perceptions,
motivations, and behaviors. With constantly evolving ecosystems, markets and consumption
patterns (e.g. Caldieraro et al., 2018; Lamberton and Rose, 2012), sharing platforms need to
understand the factors that draw and keep consumers with the platform. Building platform
brand equity and loyalty can be effective in developing a competitive advantage.
Service provider motivations and behaviors
Much academic research has focused on demand-side consumer motivation, but relatively
fewer studies investigated the motivations of peer service providers (Karlsson and
470
JOSM
30,4
Dolnicar, 2016; Hall and Krueger, 2018). We consider service providers’ main motivations
and decision-making processes next.
Financial benefits and entrepreneurial freedom
One of the main draws of platform business models for providers is that platforms tend to
offer flexibility to providers with low barriers to entry. This flexibility allows service
providers to gain income for assets and resources they already own and are underutilized,
and let them use these underutilized assets and resources when and how they wish rather
than being restricted by traditional job positions (Benoit et al., 2017). For example, Uber
drivers can enter destinations for trips that are aligned with trips already intended (e.g. to/
from work). Approximately two-thirds of Uber drivers use the platform as an additional
income source over regular employment; Uber is the only source of personal income only for
one-fifth of drivers (Hall and Krueger, 2018). Uber also provides a bridge for workers who
are seeking another position in the labor market and offers higher earnings per hour than
the traditional taxi businesses (Hall and Krueger, 2018). Overall, service providers
participate in the sharing economy platforms for financial gain – driven either by the needs
to cover basic necessities or to create additional income to afford the things that are
normally unaffordable to them (Karlsson and Dolnicar, 2016).
Reduced set-up, distribution and transaction costs
Platform liquidity-enabled matching and process efficiencies reduce transaction
costs. Platforms effectively enable providers to “distribute” highly unique services
(e.g. a trip from near a service provider’s home to near his work place). Furthermore,
a convenient and effective technology interface with the platform lowers the barrier to
entry for service providers and reduces their listing and distribution costs. That is, it is
relatively easier and costs less to advertise one’s assets and services on a platform
compared to listing on websites or running one’s own website, which tends to be
expensive and ineffective as these channels typically lack in transaction liquidity (Bakos,
1997; Zervas et al., 2017). In sum, platform models allow providers to bring their excess
capacity to market at low cost and therefore significantly expand supply, even for short
peak demand periods.
Social interaction and sharing
In addition to economic benefits, service providers in the sharing economy can be
motivated by social needs (e.g. “cultural interaction”) and genuine passion and excitement
for meeting people (e.g. “meeting fun and interesting people”), and being welcoming
and hospitable (e.g. in the context of Airbnb; Karlsson and Dolnicar, 2016; Liu and
Mattila, 2017).
Relatedly, provider participation can be motivated by a perceived obligation to do good
for others and for the environment (e.g. helping others, sharing and participating in
sustainable behavior; Prothero et al., 2011; Sacks, 2011), and by mutual respect, compassion,
sympathy for others, and the feelings of fun and joy from sharing (Hellwig et al., 2015).
Policy makers and society in the peer-to-peer sharing economy
The significant growth of the sharing economy has resulted in a new array of issues for
regulators and policy makers. Sharing platforms can result in immediate tax revenue
losses as demand is shifted away from traditional, tax paying, and regulated businesses,
and taxing peer-to-peer platforms has proven to be a challenge (Zervas et al., 2017).
Competition may be distorted if regulation applies to traditional businesses such as hotels
and taxi companies, which follow taxation codes, labor laws and safety regulations, but
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may be circumvented by platforms players and their service providers. Furthermore,
it has been suggested that home sharing platforms harm neighborhoods, distort the
housing market and reduce the stock of affordable housing for residents. For these
reasons, restrictive regulation on sharing platforms has been advocated by incumbent
firms, workers for incumbent firms, and wary “neighbors” of sharing economy users
(Rauch and Schleicher, 2015).
Advocates of the sharing economy highlight various benefits of sharing platforms,
including increased tourist arrivals and spending (Boros et al., 2018), extra incomes for local
service providers, higher traveler well-being, and better asset and resource allocation and
utilization for society at large. For example, Airbnb makes inexpensive accommodation
available that can increase travel and tourism receipts overall through, for example, higher
spending with restaurants, retailers, and tourist attractions. Furthermore, indirect revenues
through the higher spending power of service providers (e.g. hosts) are also likely to boost
the local economy. Together, these effects could lead to a net increase in economic activity
and employment, and even an overall increase in tax revenue.
To embrace the benefits of the sharing economy while mitigating potential negative
effects, policy makers need to address these challenges, for example, through effective laws,
regulation, and norms to encourage actors to engage in positive behaviors, and, at the same
time, discourage negative interactions (Tiwana, 2013). These may include effective systems
of taxation and penalties (An, 2018) and maintaining overall a level playing field for
competition (Gyódi, 2017).
Platform players themselves can also work on easing regulatory issues. For example, to
overcome the stigma of home sharing among non-host property stakeholders, Airbnb
started its Friendly Buildings Program to incentivize landlords, property managers and
homeowner associations to let people in their buildings host on Airbnb by sharing
information and revenue with these stakeholders. This program also underlies Airbnb’s
new Niido brand in which Airbnb is partnering with real estate developers to make entire
buildings Airbnb-ready (Studach, 2017; Ting, 2018).
Finally, although celebrated by some as ecologically friendly, potential negative
environmental outcomes of sharing platforms have been highlighted. For example, Font
Vivanco et al. (2015) estimate that car-sharing services contribute to increasing emission
rather than reducing it as lower prices can increase the miles traveled in cars and switch
commuters from more environmental-friendly public transport. Tussyadiah and Pesonen
(2016) also note that sharing platforms increase the overall travel frequency and length of
stay, which likely leads to a negative environmental impact (e.g. through additional
air travel).
Summary, conclusions and further research
Summary and conclusions
We suggest that the key differences between pipeline and platform business models lie in
what they use to create value – one-sided transactions based on internally produced
products vs multi-sided exchanges that leverage the assets and resources of network actors;
how they create value – linear optimization of internal processes vs lowering transaction
costs and enhancing value through high-quality matching, managing heterogeneity of
supply and demand, fostering trust and ecosystem governance; intra-organizational
dynamics that enable value creation – reliance on capacity-constrained assets vs lower
capacity constraints due to lower costs of production and dynamic demand-based pricing;
and in how they leverage ecosystem innovation – innovation from within the firm vs
innovation from within the firm plus ecosystem-wide innovation. Integrating and
channeling assets and resources, as opposed to accumulating and owning them, is the key to
platform success.
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Our competitive analysis suggests that peer-to-peer sharing platforms’ competitive
advantage is less powerful than widely assumed. Beyond a critical level of transaction
liquidity, platforms have to look at other aspects of their business model to support value
appropriation. These include the service provider experience (including user onboarding
and interface design), developing an ecosystem of complementors, and platform governance
to build trust of stakeholders and brand equity of the platform.
Directions for further research
Table III lists research questions that emerged throughout this paper. A few topics we are
particularly excited about are elaborated next.
Success factors for different platform types. Our focus was on access-based, peer-to-peer
sharing platforms that match capacity-constrained assets and resources. Future
research should examine access-based platforms that rely on marketer-provided assets
(not peer-to-peer) such as Zipcar, which owns and controls a fleet of cars (bottom right
quadrant in Figure 2), and compare them to the peer-to-peer sharing platforms and
traditional pipeline business models.
The sharing of the capacity-constrained assets and resources (e.g. cars, rooms and
labor) examined in this paper is also fundamentally different from the sharing of capacity-
unconstrained assets (e.g. files, music, information and ratings), which can be
simultaneously consumed by many people without capacity restrictions. These include
social media, communication, and content platforms (see Figure 1). Given their access to
millions of user profiles, such platforms’ revenue models rely largely on targeted
advertising (Aguirre et al., 2015). Contrasting core properties underlying the different
platforms based on capacity-constrained vs unconstrained assets and resources, and their
impact on sources of competitive advantage (e.g. direct vs indirect network effects)
warrant further research.
Converging business models. Businesses know that the characteristics associated
with their primary business model – pipeline or platform – need to be dynamic and
malleable to remain competitive. Thus, while sharing platform businesses have flourished
due to their ability to scale and indirect network effects, ignoring the potential
benefits associated with pipeline business models would be limiting a platform’s future
growth trajectory. Uber is considering owning autonomous vehicles and Airbnb works on
owning and controlling room inventory, effectively moving closer to sharing platform-
provided assets and resources, and to their pipeline counterparts such as Hertz and
Marriot, respectively.
Similarly, pipeline businesses have recognized that to starve off the threats to their
positions as dominant incumbents, they can leverage the characteristics of platform
business models (Hagiu, 2018). For example, Marriott International partnered with London-
based home rental management company Hostmaker to offer homes via a new brand
Tribute Portfolio Homes. Marriott’s move is reflective of its platform-type ambitions,
transitioning away from hotel ownership and operations towards a branded marketplace
platform (Richard and Cleveland, 2016).
Value co-creation and sharing in the new economy have been fundamentally altered by
the convergence of business models, which refers to the simultaneous integration of
pipeline-like characteristics into platform business models (Akbar and Tracogna, 2018) or
the hybridization of the platform business model characteristics into pipeline business
models (Van Alstyne and Parker, 2017; Zhu and Furr, 2016). Value creation is not simply
about a choice of the platform or pipeline business model, but rather a continuum
(Andreassen et al., 2018). Future research is needed to explore the nature, dynamics and
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Future research topics Research questions
Platform business models
Other types of
access-based platforms
What are the key differences between P2P, access-based sharing platforms that
were discussed in this paper and access-based sharing platforms that rely on
marketer-supplied assets (e.g. Zipcar) in terms of value creation, network effects,
ecosystem dynamics and competitive advantage?
Capacity-constrained vs
unconstrained assets
The sharing of supply-constrained assets (e.g. cars, rooms and scooters) is
fundamentally different from sharing capacity-unconstrained assets (e.g. media
content). What are the implications for revenue models, platform growth, network
effects and ecosystem dynamics when sharing platforms do not have capacity
constraints?
Convergence of
business models
How does the convergence of business models (i.e. pipeline businesses adding
platform components and platform businesses adding pipeline components) impact
value creation, value capture, and the optimal assets mix provided by the platform
owner/pipeline business and by a platform’s peer providers?
Platform governance
Governance
mechanisms
What is the relative effectiveness of different types of institutional, community-
based and legal governance mechanisms and incentives for creating ecosystem
value and preventing user disintermediation?
Broader ecosystem How are norms developed within a sharing platform also driven by other, related
ecosystems (e.g. how do norms operative in a ride-sharing ecosystem influence
those in a room sharing ecosystem; Benoit et al., 2017)?
Consumer behavior
Search friction What drives search friction for providers and users of platforms? How can search
friction be mitigated, especially related to choice overload and over-communication
(Chen et al., 2018)? How effective are decision aids that help users to filter, sort,
compare and rank options? How effective are customized search tools and
recommendation systems that cater to individuals’ preferences?
Can service robots or chat bots be developed to take on communications and
decision making for both service provides and customers (cf. Wirtz et al., 2018)?
How can stakeholders be motivated to allow such robots to transact on their behalf
and thereby significantly reduce search friction?
How can feedback and rating system be designed to reduce friction caused by
information asymmetry?
How can the matching process be made more effective, including offering more
instantaneous booking functions and limiting the number of options presented to
travelers through a more refined search?
What is the role in risk reduction and decision confidence of allowing users to
challenge payment due to unsatisfactory service?
Consumer expectations Are there fundamental differences in how consumers form expectations about
service providers on sharing platforms vs traditional incumbent providers (Benoit
et al., 2017)?
Reviews and ratings What are the consequences of a mutual rating system (i.e. the ability of consumers
(e.g. Uber riders) to rate service providers (e.g. drivers) and vice versa (e.g. quality
assurance vs strategic behaviors for both actors such as inflating review ratings)?
How can providers and users be encouraged to provide more, more accurate and
more detailed reviews? How can rating inflation be reduced (cf. Fradkin et al., 2018;
Pera et al., 2019)?
How can negative reviews be made less costly such as through reduced risk of
retaliation and harassment (Tadelis, 2016)? How effective are controlled anonymity
schemes (i.e. the platform conceals the identities of the raters but knows their
identity and monitors their ratings; Dellarocas, 2000) and analytics (e.g. use
analytics to correct biases to estimate unbiased rating estimates; Dellarocas and
(continued )
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Future research topics Research questions
Wood, 2008)?
How can “bought” or outright fake reviews be reduced?
Overall, how can the gap between rating and reality be minimized (Masum and
Zhang, 2004)?
Trust building How does the trust-building process between consumers and providers evolve over
time at different stages of the consumer journey (which can involve both online and
in-person components)?
How can trust be built with the platform and between players in a platform’s
ecosystem (Chen et al., 2009)? How do trust in the platform and trust in peers
interact with each other?
Can blockchain technology offer a powerful alternative to verify and authenticate
the true identify of parties, ensure traceable recording of transactions and in the
process build trust? Will the parties on a platform feel more secure if their
transactions are secured by blockchain technology (Chen et al., 2018)?
Platform communities How can stakeholders be motivated to engage in platform brand communities that
provide information, support and other value-add (cf. Wirtz et al., 2013)
Transformative
experience
In what ways does exchange on sharing economy platforms become
transformative and self-expansive (extended self; Belk, 2013) beyond creating
experiential, hedonic and social values?
Service failure and
recovery
What is the attribution process in the event of service failure and recovery? That is,
which party do consumers blame – the platform, provider or complementor – and
who do they expect provide recovery and in what form?
Role of brand How does branding of platforms differ from branding pipeline businesses
(e.g. promoting differentiation in the case of pipeline models vs signaling trust,
reducing risk perceptions with platforms)?
How can brands be developed to be multi-sided whereby branding to service
providers, consumers and complementors offer different value propositions?
How can service providers differentiate themselves from others on the same
platform (Benoit et al., 2017)?
Service providers as
brand ambassadors
How can peer service providers be motivated to act as brand ambassadors with
little or no formal training (Benoit et al., 2017)?
Platform loyalty What causes consumers to be on more than one competing platform (e.g.
multi-homing on Uber and Lyft), and what are the consequences on their switching
behavior, loyalty, emotional connection and bargaining power with their platform
providers?
How can platforms build loyalty, engagement and related behaviors through
evangelizing, milestoning, badging and documenting (Perren and Kozinets, 2018)?
How can soft and hard incentives that are used widely in generic loyalty programs
be adapted to encourage increased transactions on a platform? How effective are
loyalty program-induced switching costs and incentives in driving platform loyalty
(Chen et al., 2018)?
Price setting What are the benefits and costs of sharing platforms allowing providers and/or
users to set prices (e.g. Uber sets prices on their platform, whereas Airbnb lets
service providers decide on the pricing; Chen et al., 2018)?
Regulation and society
Low-income consumers What economic and societal implications do sharing platforms have for low-income
consumers who are likely to gain access to services at a lower price (Benoit et al.,
2017)?
Sustainability and labor
market
What quantifiable impact have sharing platforms made on sustainability
(e.g. reduced resource uses) and labor markets (e.g. stimulating employment)?
Regulation How can regulators better facilitate the integration of sharing platforms and
traditional service providers into existing regulatory systems (Cohen and
Kietzmann, 2014)?
Cultural/societal
differences
What cultural and societal differences play a role in the adoption, regulation and
governance of sharing platforms in different countries and cultures? Table III.
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optimal configurations of convergence business models, their impact on the nature of
competition, and the wider consumer, societal and economic impacts.
In addition, new technologies such as blockchains may provide opportunities for
peer-to-peer transactions taking place without middlemen or mediating organizations,
which could provide a disruption to existing platform and pipeline businesses alike. Thus,
how platforms and pipeline businesses embrace these new technologies in the process of
convergence will have significant impact on their value propositions and competitive
position (Andreassen et al., 2018), may offer additional avenues to achieve cost-effective
service excellence (cf. Wirtz and Zeithaml, 2018) and represent exciting avenues for
future research.
Consumer behavior related to sharing platforms. There are vast open areas for consumer
research related to sharing platforms (see Table III) and a noticeable gap relates to branding.
There is little research that provides theoretical or practical insight into how to brand
platforms and their service providers (Baumeister et al., 2015), and whether and how
branding principles and considerations differ for the sharing economy from those of the
traditional pipeline-based products (Van Alstyne et al., 2016). The differences are
particularly relevant, given that the role of a brand is potentially altered in the context of
platform business models (Dussart, 2001).
Specifically, in pipeline businesses, brands are mostly end-user facing, promote
differentiation from competition, manage customer expectations, build consumer trust in the
offering, and require significant investments over long periods of time (Van Alstyne et al.,
2016). A key difference in the platform context is that the brand, in addition to fulfilling its
customer-facing function, primarily serves as an enabler of stakeholder and ecosystem
engagement. This may impact the nature and dynamics of brand creation and development
and is an interesting area of future research. Relatedly, the branding of convergence
business models, with its pipeline and platform components, also presents exciting avenues
for future exploration.
Finally, Big Data and related analytics are expected to provide added leverage to
platform business models. For example, Martin-Fuentes et al. (2018) used a Big Data
technique called support vector machine classification to create a hotel-like grading scheme
for Airbnb accommodation. They highlight how their grading system can be used to
generate trust within the platform by alleviating information asymmetry and preventing
opportunistic host behaviors, and by solving the problem of information overload for
potential guests who may be overwhelmed by the many reviews associated with numerous
heterogeneous options.
In a similar vein, Ma et al. (2018) suggest that a form of machine learning technique called
“deep learning” can be used to understand information value of online consumer posts.
For example, convolutional neural networks can detect features in texts and images to
encode meaning and emotional expressions (Chevalier and Mayzlin, 2006; He et al., 2016).
Research is required on how these technologies can be developed to prove useful for
platforms, service providers, and users alike.
In conclusion, we hope this paper helps to integrate and synthesize our understanding of
peer-to-peer sharing platforms and that it will encourage further research in this fascinating
and rapidly developing field.
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